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The U.S. Army Contracting Command National Capital Region 
Contracting Center (ACC-NCRCC or NCRCC) incorporates the Army’s 
Contracting Center of Excellence (CCE) and the U.S. Army Information 
Technology, E-Commerce and Commercial Contracting Center (ITEC4).  CCE 
provides contracting support to the Army Secretariat and the Army Staff.  ITEC4 
provides worldwide information technology contracting support and procures 
enterprise information technology support and equipment for Army and 
Department of Defense (DoD) activities (ACC, 2009, n.p.).  The purpose of this 
research is to measure the turnover rate of the NCRCC’s contract specialists, 
assess its contract management capability process maturity and determine if a 
relationship exists between the two. 
Research for this study consisted of collecting NCRCC contract specialist 
statistical data and qualifications from NCRCC Human Resources (HR) for the 
12-month period observed and using it to calculate the turnover rate.  The 
research also included deploying survey questions to the NCRCC workforce to 
assess its contract management process capability maturity. 
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The U.S. Army Contracting Command National Capital Region 
Contracting Center (ACC-NCRCC or NCRCC) incorporates the Army’s 
Contracting Center of Excellence (CCE) and the U.S. Army Information 
Technology, E-Commerce and Commercial Contracting Center (ITEC4).  CCE 
provides contracting support to the Army Secretariat and the Army Staff.  ITEC4 
provides worldwide information technology contracting support and procures 
enterprise information technology support and equipment for Army and 
Department of Defense (DoD) activities (ACC, 2009, n.p.).  The purpose of this 
research is to measure the turnover rate of the NCRCC’s contract specialists, 
assess its contract management capability process maturity and determine if a 
relationship exists between the two. 
Research for this study consisted of collecting NCRCC contract specialist 
statistical data and qualifications from NCRCC Human Resources (HR) for the 
12-month period observed and using it to calculate the turnover rate.  The 
research also included deploying survey questions to the NCRCC workforce to 
assess its contract management process capability maturity. 
The results of this research shows that no apparent relationship exists 
between the NCRCC contract specialist turnover rate and its contract 
management process capability maturity.  The NCRCC turnover rate is low as 
compared to the entire Federal Government’s turnover rate for the period 
observed; however, NCRCC leadership should measure and track employee 
turnover as well as the costs associated with it to manage its workforce and 
protect its brand.  Generally, NCRCC’s contract management process maturity 
level is low.  CCE received an Ad-hoc maturity rating for the Procurement 
Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Contract Administration, and 
Contract Closeout key process areas and a Basic maturity rating for the Source 
Selection key process area.  ITEC4 received a Basic maturity rating for all six key 
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process areas.  Recommendations for improving NCRCC’s maturity level 
consists of establishing and institutionalizing processes and standards, 
mandating its employees to use them on all contracts, initiating organization-wide 
CM training, developing efficiency and effectiveness metrics, and building a 





The purpose of this chapter is to present a general overview of this 
research project.  It will provide the research purpose, objectives and background 
information.  Next, it will describe the research methodology, the limitations of the 
research, and the primary and subsidiary research questions.  It will then explain 
the organization of this report and lastly, provide a chapter summary.  
B. RESEARCH PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
In this project, the author will analyze the turnover rate for NCRCC 
contract specialists and assess NCRCC’s Contract Management (CM) process 
capability maturity level using the Contract Management Maturity Model © 
(CMMM ©) (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 49).  The CMMM is an approach to 
assessing process capability maturity by focusing on six key process areas:  
Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Source Selection, 
Contract Administration, and Contract Closeout (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 
49).  Based on this analysis, the author will then attempt to determine if a 
relationship exists between the NCRCC’s contract specialist turnover rate and its 
CM process capability maturity. 
The author expects that if any relationship exists, the NCRCC turnover 
rate will impact its maturity level and not the other way around.  It is unlikely that 
the reverse would exist.  Lastly, the author will identify possible solutions and 
recommend approaches to improve NCRCC’s organizational capability based on 
the analysis.  The results of this research will assist NCRCC leadership in 
identifying areas that may need additional emphasis such as personnel, 
resources, and training. 
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C. BACKGROUND 
Since the end of the Cold War, DoD significantly reduced the size of its 
civilian contracting workforce through downsizing, base realignments and 
closures (BRACs), and competitive sourcing initiatives.  The Department 
assumed that after the Cold War ended the contracting workload would decrease 
(GAO-04-753, 2004, p. 7).  DoD did not anticipate that in addition to planned 
workforce reductions that the workforce would be further reduced as the baby 
boom generation began to retire.  Experts estimate that by the year 2012, the 
acquisition workforce will reduce by half due to a retirement eligible workforce 
(SARA, 2007, p. 3).  This has created an acquisition workforce shortage at a time 
when DoD contracts have increased in both complexity and volume (Gansler, 
2007, p. 14) and DoD needs experienced CM personnel to manage its workload. 
In NCRCC, the workforce shortage is further complicated because it is 
geographically located in the National Capital Region (NCR), just outside of the 
nation’s capital where there are many defense and civilian Government 
contracting agencies as well as industry contracting organizations.  These 
organizations compete for skilled contract specialists thus creating “a war for 
talent” (Mathis & Jackson, 2003, p. 80) and contracting professionals are enticed 
to climb the career ladder by ‘job-hopping’ and ‘job shopping’ (Harrison, R., 2008, 
p. 49).  The current ‘buyer’s market’ for contract specialists has led to an 
increase in the turnover rate for these employees within Government and 
industry contracting organizations.  A high turnover rate in the NCRCC could 
impede its ability to complete its mission successfully and could negatively 
impact the NCRCC brand, which should support its vision:  “To be the best 
contracting service experience” (NCRCC Town Hall Meeting, 2009, p. 4). 
A high turnover rate can lead to an unstable workforce that is likely to 
have difficulty managing mature contract processes.  This is because unstable 
organizations endure new employees consistently going through a process 
learning curve so that even if an organization has standardized processes in 
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place, the individuals responsible for working within them may have difficulty 
putting them into practice.  A stable workforce is more capable of implementing 
mature, standardized processes and continuously improving them until these 
processes become mature. 
If NCRCC wishes to protect its brand, it must maintain a competitive 
advantage over other contracting organizations within NCR, in terms of 
successful performance.  It requires “a systematic approach to assessing 
effectiveness and competence” (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 49).  The Contract 
Management Maturity Model © (CMMM ©) is one useful tool for conducting such 
an assessment.  Applying the CMMM © will allow NCRCC to determine its CM 
process capability maturity for the six key process areas, which will “serve as the 
foundation for ongoing discussion and further development within” the 
contracting center (Garrett, 2007, p. 214). 
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research for this project consists of collecting NCRCC contract specialist 
turnover rate statistical data and qualifications from NCRCC Human Resources 
(HR) for one 12-month period, April 2008 through March 2009, and using it to 
calculate the turnover rate.  The research will be limited to NCRCC 
nonsupervisory contract specialists, grade GS-12 and above.  These contract 
specialists work ‘where the rubber meets the road’ and should be performing at 
journeyman or advanced levels.  The research also includes deploying survey 
questions to the NCRCC workforce to assess its CM process capability maturity.  
The author will look for a relationship between NCRCC’s turnover rate and its CM 
process capability maturity level, report the findings and offer recommendations 
for improvement. 
E. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Turnover rate calculations used in this research project are not exact for a 
variety of reasons.  First, the author will use a modified version of the turnover 
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rate formula described in Chapter II to calculate the turnover rate.  The formula 
described in Chapter II calculates turnover using mid-month data; however, this 
was not available to the author who therefore, calculated NCRCC’s turnover rate 
using end-of-month data.  Further, the total number of employees used to 
calculate the turnover rate includes employees located at Fort Huachuca, AZ.  
One cannot attribute the turnover of these employees to market conditions in 
NCR.  Lastly, the turnover analysis in this project does not distinguish between 
dysfunctional and controllable turnover from other turnover types, however, 
NCRCC stakeholders should consider this when using this research. 
The CM process maturity assessment may also be slightly limited.  One 
reason is that the author obtained CM maturity data from an online survey that 
NCRCC contract specialists completed anonymously.  Subsequently, the survey 
results are only as accurate as the data that survey participants entered.  Finally, 
the research only invited NCRCC nonsupervisory contract specialists grade GS-
12 and above to participate in the survey since this group is the focus of the 
research.  Approximately 204 employees were eligible to participate and 137 
surveys were completed (20 for CCE and 117 for ITEC4) for a response rate of 
67%.  Larger or smaller sample sizes may result in different findings. 
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This project addresses two primary and four subsidiary research 
questions: 
1. Primary Research Questions 
a. What is the current turnover rate of contract specialists in NCRCC? 
b. What is the current maturity level of NCRCC’s contract 
management processes? 
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2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a. Is there a relationship between NCRCC contract specialist turnover 
and the maturity level of its contract management processes? 
b. How does the contract specialist turnover rate affect NCRCC’s 
contract specialist average experience level? 
c. How does NCRCC’s contract specialist average experience level 
affect its training requirement? 
d. How can NCRCC raise its CM process maturity level? 
G. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
The author organized this report into five chapters.  Chapter I, the 
Introduction, discusses the purpose and objectives of the study, provides 
background information, explains the research methodology, the research 
limitations, sets forth the primary and secondary research questions, and 
explains the organization of this report.  Chapter II, the Literature Review, 
discusses the current contracting environment, employee turnover, the Contract 
Management Maturity Model © (CMMM), and their impact or contracting 
organizations.  Chapter III describes the National Capital Region Contracting 
Center, its major and subordinate commands and their missions, organizational 
structures, workforce makeup, and explains why NCRCC is suitable for this 
study.  Chapter IV provides the results of the NCRCC turnover analysis and the 
results of the CM process maturity analysis.  Chapter V presents the author’s 
research conclusions, summarize the research findings, and discuss possible 
areas for further research. 
H. SUMMARY 
DoD is facing an acquisition workforce shortage at a time when its 
contract requirements have become more complex and voluminous (Gansler, 
2007, p. 14).  Additionally, NCRCC must compete with other contracting 
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organizations for CM personnel in NCR.  If NCRCC’s contract specialist turnover 
rate is too high, and its workforce becomes unstable, its brand may suffer.  One 
way to protect the NCRCC brand is to assess its CM process capability and use 
the assessment to identify process improvement opportunities as recommended 
in this research project. 
In this chapter, the author discussed the research purpose and objectives, 
described background information, and the research methodology.  Next, the 
author presented the limitations of the research, research questions, and the 
report organization.  The next chapter will provide a literature review on 
employee turnover and CM process maturity. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the current government contracting environment 
and explains why it is important for contracting organizations, particularly those in 
NCR, to assess its employee turnover rate and CM process maturity level.  It 
describes different turnover types, explains how to measure it and what turnover 
costs an organization.  Next, this chapter explains why analyzing CM process 
capability is important to NCRCC, describes the purpose of assessing process 
capability maturity, presents the Contract Management Maturity Model © 
(CMMM), and explains how and why CM process maturity is measured. 
B. CURRENT CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENT 
Government contracting processes are under tremendous public scrutiny.  
Media focus on Federal contracts in Iraq such as the State Department’s private 
security contract with Blackwater Worldwide (Dreazen, 2009) and the Army’s 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract with KBR Halliburton 
(Castelli, 2009) have drawn public awareness to Federal contracting processes. 
This awareness increased after the passage of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act, 2009), as United States tax payers 
demanded to know how the Government would spend their tax dollars to 
stimulate the economy.  The President of the United States’ March 4, 2009 
memorandum on the subject of government contracting focuses on competition, 
contract type, and outsourcing initiatives (Government Contracting, 2009).  In 
addition, the Federal Government established a website that provides Federal 
contract information to the American public (USAspending.com, 2009), a result of 
the President’s push for transparency (Transparency, 2009). 
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According to the Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy and the U.S. Congress, “The demands on the 
[contracting] workforce, both in terms of the complexity… and nature of what is 
bought, have markedly increased since the 1980s” (SARA, 2007, p. 18).  The 
Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations states, “The Army’s acquisition workforce is not adequately staffed, 
trained, structured, or empowered to meet the Army needs of the 21st Century 
deployed warfighters” (Gansler, 2007, p. 2). 
The Gansler Commission determined that: 
Contract management is the essential post-award contracting 
function to ensure mission accomplishment, and to ensure that the 
Government obtains the required work on time and at the quality 
level called for by the contract.  It is also an important control over 
fraud, waste, and abuse.  (Gansler, 2007, p. 27) 
The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) has identified 
DoD Contract Management as “high risk” in its biennial report to Congress every 
year since 1992.  GAO’s High-Risk Series lists government operations that are 
vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the operations need 
broad-based transformation to address major economy, efficiency, or 
effectiveness challenges (GAO-09-271, 2009).  One of the reasons that GAO 
included DoD Contract Management on its list is the department’s CM personnel 
shortage (GAO-09-271, 2009, p. 73).  GAO explains that: 
Properly managing the acquisition of goods and services requires a 
workforce with the right skills and capabilities. DOD reports it has 
identified the competencies needed by its contracting officers but 
DOD officials acknowledged that more needs to be done to close 
skill gaps and to expand efforts to those who perform oversight or 
other key acquisition roles. (GAO-09-271, 2009, p. 73) 
Ken Krieg, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (AT&L) also believes that DoD AT&L faces a potential 
talent shortage.  Krieg says that if the shortage is not effectively addressed, it will 
“have a detrimental impact on the responsiveness and quality of our acquisition 
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outcomes that support the national security mission” (AT&L, 2007).  
Subsequently, DoD AT&L, in its Human Capital Strategic Plan v. 3.0 established 
a goal to: 
ensure DoD AT&L Components attract, develop, and retain a highly 
talented, motivated, and diverse workforce by implementing best 
practices and strategies to establish DoD and acquisition 
organizations as employers of choice.  (AT&L, 2007, p. 36) 
The public scrutiny of government contracts and increased demand on the 
on the contracting workforce as well as an inability to meet contracting needs 
have made it critical for DoD and Army contracting organizations to keep their 
turnover rates low and  increase their CM process maturity.  They can keep 
turnover low by obtaining, developing, and retaining the right human capital 
talents (AT&L, 2007, n.p.) and they can increase their CM process maturity by 
assessing its CM capabilities, identifying areas for improvement, and 
implementing efforts to improve. 
C. EMPLOYEE TURNOVER 
Employee “turnover occurs when employees leave an organization and 
have to be replaced…[it is] related to job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment” (Mathis & Jackson, 2003, p. 78).  One can classify turnover in a 
number of ways: 
1. Involuntary – terminations for poor performance or work rule 
violations 
2. Voluntary – employee leaves by choice 
3. Functional – lower-performing or disruptive employees leave 
4. Dysfunctional – key individuals and high performers leave at critical 
times 
5. Uncontrollable – occurs for reasons outside the impact of the 
employer 
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6. Controllable – occurs due to factors that could be influenced by the 
employer 
(Mathis & Jackson, 2003, pp. 78–79) 
“Not all [employee] turnover is negative” (Mathis & Jackson, 2003, p. 79).  
Organizations benefit when turnover occurs for involuntary or functional reasons.  
Permitting poor performers to remain in the workplace can lead to other 
undesirable results.  Voluntary and uncontrollable turnover may negatively affect 
organizations; however, they are typically due to employee’s personal reasons 
(for example, an employee relocating or the birth of a child) and the organization 
cannot do anything about that (Mathis & Jackson, 2003, p. 79). 
The types of turnovers that organizations should be concerned about are 
dysfunctional and controllable.  In these instances, the turnover is usually 
disruptive to the workplace, occurs at critical times, and more often than not, the 
employer could have retained a separating employee, had it responded 
appropriately to the employee’s concerns (Mathis & Jackson, 2003, p. 79). 
D. MEASURING TURNOVER RATE 
The first step for stakeholders to determine the impact of employee 
turnover in an organization is to calculate its turnover rate.  There are varieties of 
methods to calculate employee turnover; however, one of the more widely used 
methods is a formula used by the U.S. Department of Labor (Mathis & Jackson, 
2003, p. 89): 
Number of employee separations during the month × 100 
Total number of employees at mid-month 
(Mathis & Jackson, 2003, p. 90) 
Stakeholders can use this formula to determine the turnover rate of an 
entire organization or they can use it to determine the turnover rate for specific 
demographics such as individual departments, locations, or key positions (Mathis 
& Jackson, 2003, p. 90). 
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An organization’s Human Resources Department (HR) should calculate 
the turnover rate regularly and report it to management so that management can 
spot trends or potential problems and make adjustments as needed.  
Management should track key information to look for controllable or dysfunctional 
turnover patterns.  Some examples are when large numbers of employees leave 
to work for the same organizations or when a number of employees leave for the 
same or similar reasons.  Management should implement employee surveys with 
its employees and conduct exit interviews with separating employees to obtain 
this information (Mathis & Jackson, 2003, pp. 90-91). 
Management should also measure the ‘internal churn rate’ (Sullivan, 
2009).  This is a measure of internal transfers from one department to others.  
High internal churn rates in particular areas may indicate problems with individual 
managers or career fields (Sullivan, 2009).  Tracking this information allows 
management to identify its problem areas so it can plan and implement solutions 
to slow down its controllable and dysfunctional turnover rates.   
E. THE COST OF TURNOVER 
High turnover in an organization can be an expensive problem.  Direct 
costs associated with recruiting and retaining employees, such as marketing, 
advertising, salary, benefits, and training, are recurring costs for organizations 
with a high employee turnover rate.  The costing model shown in Figure 1 
illustrates one simplified method of determining turnover costs (Mathis & 






Simplified Turnover Costing Model 
Job Title _______________________________________ 
A. Typical annual pay for job _______________
B. Percentage of pay for benefits times (×) annual pay _______________
C. Total  employee annual cost (add A+B) _______________
D. How many employees voluntarily quit in this job in the past 12 months? _______________
E. How long does it take one employee to become fully productive (in months)? _______________
F. Per person turnover cost: (Multiply E ÷ 12 × C × 50 %*) _______________
G. Annual Turnover cost for this job: (Multiply F × D) _______________
 *Assumes 50% productivity throughout the learning period (E).  
Figure 1.   Simplified Turnover Costing Model (From Mathis & Jackson, 
2003, p. 90) 
One example of determining costs of turnover using the simplified model 
is as follows: 
In [the] model, if a job pays $20,000 (A) and benefits cost 40% (B), 
then the total annual cost for one employee is $28,000.  Assuming 
20 employees quit in the previous year (D) and that it takes three 
months for one employee to be fully productive, the calculation in 
(F) results in a per person turnover cost of $3,500.  Overall, the 
annual turnover costs would be $70,000 for the 20 individuals who 
left.  (Mathis & Jackson, 2003, p. 90) 
More detailed and sophisticated turnover costing models take into account 
costs for hiring, training, productivity, and separation (Mathis & Jackson, 2003, p. 
91). 
Organizations might also consider other costs that are more difficult to 
measure, intangible costs, such as customer goodwill, reputation or image 
(Carter, 2008, p. 58).  Organizations with an unstable workforce may have 
difficulty accomplishing its mission successfully and as a result, its brand may 
suffer which can cost it business.  Additionally, organizations that fail to retain its 
employees may suffer from “knowledge gaps or brain drains” (Harrison, R., 2008, 
p. 49) as it loses its intellectual assets (Harrison, J.S., 2008, p. 58). 
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Heinrich von Pierer, CEO of thee German industrial powerhouse 
Siemens, has stated, “Between sixty and eighty percent of the 
value-added we generate is linked directly to knowledge—and that 
proportion is growing. (Harrison, J.S., 2008, p. 58) 
All of these direct and indirect costs associated with employee turnover 
affect an organization’s total cost of ownership (Harrison, J.S., 2008, p. 58).  The 
total cost of ownership for an organization with a high turnover rate, is much 
higher than one that does not.  Organizations with high turnover rates incur 
additional recurring costs in the form of inefficiencies each time they replace an 
employee during the time it takes for the new employee work his or her way 
through a learning curve to become fully productive.  Organizations with a low 
turnover rate assume lower ownership costs because its employees function 
more efficiently for longer periods (Harrison, J.S., 2008, p. 58). 
It is critical for NCRCC to measure and manage its employee turnover, 
particularly dysfunctional and controllable turnover, in order for it to meet its 
mission in support of the nation’s warfighters and to protect its brand.  A stable 
NCRCC workforce should perform CM activities more efficiently and effectively 
than if it was not stable.  If NCRCC retains its employees, it will not have to 
endure a workforce that is continually going through a process learning curve, 
assuming it has standardize CM processes in place and requires its employees 
to utilize them.  The next section will discuss standardized processes, specifically 
CM process capability. 
F. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS CAPABILITY 
Contract Management (CM) is “the art and science of managing a 
contractual agreement(s) throughout the contracting process” (Garrett & Rendon, 
2005a, p. 48).  Process Capability is “inherent or natural behavior of a process 
from which all sources of instability (random variability) have been eliminated” 
(BusinessDictionary.com, 2009).  According to Rendon, leading organizations 
consider CM organizational learning and process improvement initiatives as best 
practices and focus on core processes, specifically process competence and 
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process capability.  Process capability maturity is one indicator of organizational 
learning (Rendon, 2009, p. 8). 
NCRCC, in particular, can benefit from assessing its CM process maturity 
and using the data to identify lessons learned as well as key process areas that 
may need additional emphasis, such as personnel, resources, and training 
needs.  Armed with this information, NCRCC can implement best practices and 
strategies to improve its CM process capability so that it can maintain a 
competitive advantage over other contracting organizations within NCR, in terms 
of successful performance and protect its brand. 
Generally, organizations use maturity models to assess, measure, and 
improve their process capability maturity (Rendon, 2009, p. 9).  An organizational 
capability maturity level is its “level of organizational capability created by the 
transformation of one or more domains of an organization’s processes” (Garrett 
& Rendon, 2005a, p. 48). 
Some well-known process maturity models include the Software 
Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity Model (SEI-CMM), Kerzner’s Project 
Management Maturity Model (PMMM), Project Management Solutions, Inc.’s 
Project Management Maturity Model, People Capability Maturity Model, and the 
Berkley Project Management Process Maturity (PM2) Model (Garrett, 2007, p. 
215).   These models assess project management processes rather than CM 
processes but they “reflect and evolutionary increase in process maturity focused 
on continuous improvement and adoption of lessons learned and best practices” 
(Garrett, 2007, p. 217).  One important characteristic of these maturity models is 
that they focus on established project management methods and processes that 
the project management profession accepts (Garrett, 2007, p. 219). 
The Contract Management Maturity Model © (CMMM©) uses a similar 
approach to analyze CM processes.  It is “a research-based systematic 
assessment tool designed to evaluate an organization’s overall CM process 
capability and to benchmark organizational CM policies, processes, and 
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practices” (Rendon, 2009, p. 10).  The CMMM © survey questions focus on the 
organization’s adoption of CM best practices in the areas of process strength, 
management support, process integration, and process measurement.  
Organizations interested in assessing their CM process capability maturity can 
apply the model by first administering a 62-question survey to obtain the 
organization’s CM process capability data.  The CMMM© survey uses a 
purposeful sampling method.  Researchers administer the survey only to 
individuals who are fully qualified contract specialists or contracting officers and 
have knowledge of the organization’s CM processes.  The survey assesses six 
key process areas:  Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, 
Source Selection, Contract Administration, and Contract Closeout. 
Procurement Planning is “the process of identifying which business needs 
can be best met by procuring products or services outside the organization.  This 
process involves determining whether to procure, how to procure, what to 
procure, how much to procure, and when to procure” (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, 
p. 55).  Procurement planning also includes conducting market research as 
described in Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 10, requirements analysis 
as described in FAR Part 11, determining the appropriate procurement method 
as described in FAR Parts 13, 14, and 15, and selecting the contract type as 
described in FAR Part 16 (Rendon, 2009, p. 16). 
Solicitation Planning is “the process of preparing the documents needed to 
support the solicitation.  This process involves documenting program 
requirements and identifying potential sources” (Garrett & Rendon, 2005, p. 55).  
Solicitation planning also includes documenting the requirement using a 
Statement of Work (SOW), Performance Work Statement (PWS), of Statement of 
Objectives (SOO) developing the solicitation package using the uniform contract 
format found in FAR Part 14 for Sealed Bidding and FAR Part 15 for Contracting 
by Negotiations.  Solicitation planning also includes selecting contract terms and 
conditions, and identifying potential sources (Rendon, 2009, p. 16). 
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Solicitation is “the process of obtaining information (bids or proposals) 
from prospective sellers on how project needs can be met” (Garrett & Rendon, 
2005a, p. 55).   The solicitation process area also includes conducting industry 
conferences, synopsizing requirements as described in FAR Part 5, issuing 
solicitations and amending them as needed (Rendon, 2009, p. 17). 
Source Selection is “the process of receiving bids or proposals and 
applying evaluation criteria to select a provider” (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 
55).  Source selection also includes negotiating contract terms and conditions as 
well as selecting contractors.  Depending on the requirement, this could mean 
following the sealed bidding procedures set forth in FAR Part 14 or following a 
contracting by negotiations approach as set forth in FAR Part 15.  This can range 
from selecting the lowest priced, technically acceptable offeror to selecting the 
offer determined to be the best value by using a trade-off process (Rendon, 
2009, p. 18). 
Contract Administration is “the process of ensuring that each party’s 
performance meets contractual requirements” (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 55).  
Contract administration includes monitoring and measuring contractor 
performance as set forth in FAR Part 42, managing the payment process as 
specified in FAR Part 32, and managing the contract change process as 
described in FAR Part 43 (Rendon, 2009, p. 18). 
Contract Closeout is “the process of verifying that all administrative 
matters are concluded on a contract this is otherwise physically complete.  This 
involves completing and settling the contract; including resolving any open items 
(Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 55).  Contract closeout includes ensuring and 
documenting that the contractor’s work is complete and resolving issues as 
described in FAR Part 4 (Rendon, 2009, p. 18). 
The next step in determining CM maturity is to assign a maturity level for 
each key process area.  The survey questions require responses that reveal the 
extent to which the respondent believes its organization executed or 
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implemented each of the key process areas by using a Likert scale response 
protocol.  This structure requires respondents to answer with the extent to which 
they agree or disagree with statements regarding the CM key process areas.  
The survey allows the respondents six possible answers each tied to a numerical 
point score:  Never (1), Seldom (2), Sometimes (3), Usually (4), Always (5), and I 
Don't Know (0) (Garrett, 2007, p. 231). These allow researchers to assess the 
maturity level for each process areas:  Ad Hoc, Basic, Structured, Integrated, or 
Optimized (Garrett, 2007, p. 230-1). 
Ad Hoc (Level 1) is the lowest CM process maturity level.   Organizations 
operating at this level acknowledge that CM processes exist and that they are 
accepted and practiced throughout various industries.  Management understands 
the benefit and value of using CM processes.  However, these organizations do 
not have organizational-wide established basic CM processes.  Further, some 
established CM processes may exist within the organization but CM personnel 
apply them only on an ad-hoc and sporadic basis.  No one holds managers and 
CM personnel accountable for adhering to, or complying with, any processes or 
standards (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 53). 
Basic (Level 2) is the second CM process maturity level.  Organizations 
that operate at this level have some established basic CM processes and 
standards within the organization but management does not require its personnel 
to use them on all contracts.  CM personnel apply standards only to selected 
complex, critical, or high-visibility contracts.  These organizations have 
developed some formal documentation for their established CM processes and 
standards but they do not consider their processes or established standards 
institutionalized throughout the entire organization.  Organizational leaders have 
not implemented a policy that requires personnel to use established CM 
processes consistently other than on the required contracts (Garrett & Rendon, 
2005a, p. 53). 
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Structured (Level 3) is the third CM process maturity level.  Organizations 
operating at this level have CM processes and standards fully established, 
institutionalized, and mandated throughout the entire organization.  These 
organizations have developed formal documentation for their CM processes and 
standards and have automated some of them.  Structured organizations permit 
their personnel to tailor mandated processes and documents, in consideration of 
the unique aspects of each contract.  Organizational leaders are involved in 
providing guidance, direction, and approval of key contracting strategy, 
decisions, related contract terms and conditions, and CM documents (Garrett & 
Rendon, 2005a, p. 53). 
Integrated (Level 4) is the fourth CM process maturity level.  Organizations 
operating at this level include the procurement project’s end-user as integral 
members of the procurement team.  They integrate basic CM processes with 
other organizational core processes, such as cost control, schedule 
management, performance management, and systems engineering. 
Management in Integrated organizations uses efficiency and effectiveness 
metrics to make procurement-related decisions.  Further, management 
understands its role in the procurement management process and executes the 
process well (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, 2005, p. 53). 
Optimized (Level 5) is the highest possible CM process maturity level.  
Organizations operating at this level periodically evaluate their CM processes 
using efficiency and effectiveness metrics.  They implement continuous process 
improvement efforts to improve their CM process and they implement lessons 
learned and best practice programs to improve CM processes, standards, and 
documentation.  They also implement procurement process streamlining 
initiatives as part of their process improvement program (Garrett & Rendon, 
2005a, 2005, p. 53). 
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The responses to the CMMM© survey questions are calculated and the 
numerical scores are then converted to the appropriate maturity level.  
Organizations can then plot the CM process maturity levels for each key process 
on the Contract Management Maturity Model in Table 1.  
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT MATURITY MODEL© 














      
Level 4 
Integrated 
      
Level 3 
Structured 
      
Level 2 
Basic 
      
Level 1 
Ad-Hoc 
      
Table 1.   Contract Management Maturity Model (From Garrett & Rendon,  
2005a, p. 54) 
Based on the calculated CM process maturity levels, organizational 
leadership can analyze the results and determine opportunities for process 
capability improvement and knowledge sharing within the organization. 
G. THE PURPOSE OF MEASURING CM PROCESS MATURITY 
CM process maturity data provides a “roadmap” to assist identifying areas 
that may need additional emphasis such as personnel, resources, and training. 
“The true value and primary purpose of the CMMM© is the continuous 
improvement of the organization’s CM process for buying” (Garrett & Rendon, 
2005a, p. 87).  Organizations that assess their CM periodically can monitor 
maturity improvement and “increases the organization’s competitive advantage” 
(Rendon, 2009, p. 24). 
Rendon was the first to apply the maturity model concept to the CM 
process.  Subsequently, researcher have successfully applied the CMMM© at Air 
Force commands, Naval commands, international organizations and commercial 
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industries, such as Hill Air Force Base, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 
United Nations and defense contractors.  The first Army installation to apply the 
CMMM© is the U.S. Army Joint Munitions and Lethality Contracting Center, Army 
Contracting Command, Picatinny Arsenal in September 2009 (Puma & Scherr, 
2009, p. 33). 
H. SUMMARY 
Generally, contracting organizations’ HR should track and report its 
turnover rate regularly and look for trends that indicate a pattern of key 
employees departing for reasons that management could have prevented.  The 
organization’s total cost of ownership consisting of tangible or direct costs and 
intangible costs such as the organization’s reputation or loss of intellectual assets 
can influence the organization’s ability to perform its mission.  It is important for 
NCRCC leadership and other government CM organizations to focus on 
managing turnover.  This is one reason why GAO identified DoD Contract 
Management as a “high risk” area (GAO-09-271, 2009, p. 73).  Additionally, the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 
concerned about a potential talent shortage, is emphasizing the importance of 
DoD AT&L’s ability to attract, develop and retain talented CM personnel (AT&L, 
2007, p. 36).  
This chapter provided information with regard to the current government 
contracting environment that demonstrates why it is important for contracting 
organizations to measure both their employee turnover rate and CM process 
maturity level and use the results to identify areas for improvement.  Next, it 
identified various turnover types, explained how to calculate turnover as well as 
how the costs associated with it impact an organization.  This chapter also 
explained why analyzing CM process capability will help NCRCC, described the 




Management Maturity Model © (CMMM), and explained how and why CM 
process maturity is measured.  The next chapter will introduce NCRCC as a case 
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III. NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION CONTRACTING CENTER 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of the National Capital Region 
Contracting Center and its relationship to the Army Material Command and the 
Army Contracting Command.  Additionally, this discusses NCRCC’s two 
subordinate commands, the Contracting Center of Excellence and the 
Information Technology, E-commerce and Commercial Contracting Center, their 
missions, organizational structures, and workforce makeup.  This chapter also 
explains why NCRCC is suitable for this study and includes a chapter summary. 
B. THE U.S. ARMY MATERIAL COMMAND 
The U.S. Army Material Command (AMC) provides “material readiness—
technology, acquisition support, materiel development, logistics power projection, 
and sustainment—to the total force, across the spectrum of joint military 
operations” for the army (AMC, 2009).  AMC headquarters is currently located in 
Fort Belvoir, VA but will relocate to Redstone Arsenal, AL by the summer of 2011 
as the result of a 2005 BRAC decision.  AMC also has 149 other locations 
worldwide, in over 48 states and 55 countries.  The AMC workforce consists of 
more than 66,000 military and civilian employees, many whom specialize in 
weapons development, manufacturing, and logistics (AMC, 2009).  AMC’s 
organizational structure is set forth in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.   AMC Organizational Structure (From AMC, 2009) 
C. THE U.S. ARMY CONTRACTING COMMAND 
As marked on Figure 2, the Army Contracting Command (ACC) is a 
subordinate command of AMC.  ACC provides “soldiers, civilians and contractors 
support the warfighter worldwide, through the acquisition of goods and services 
vital to the Soldier’s mission and well-being” (ACC, 2009).  ACC performs the 
majority of the contracting work for the Army.  It provides policy, procedures, 
career guidance and support to the contracting centers dedicated to the AMC 




ACC consists of two subordinate commands, the U.S. Army Expeditionary 
Contracting Command (ECC) and the Mission and Installation Contracting 
Command (MICC), 36 directorates of contracting (DOCs), and six contracting 
centers (ACC, 2009, n.p.).  ACC’s organizational structure is set forth in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.   ACC Organizational Structure (From Public Folders, 2009) 
D. NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION CONTRACTING CENTER 
As marked on Figure 3, the National Capital Region Contracting Center 
(NCRCC), the subject of this study, is an element of ACC.  ACC established 
NCRCC in January 2009 when it combined two smaller contracting centers:  the 
U.S. Army Contracting Center of Excellence (CCE) and the U.S. Army 
Information Technology, E-Commerce and Commercial Contracting Center 
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(ITEC4) to form the NCRCC.  NCRCC’s Principal Assistant Responsible for 
Contracting (PARC) also serves as the ITEC4 Director.  NCRCC’s organizational 
structure is set forth in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.   NCRCC Organizational Structure (From NCRCC Town Hall Meeting, 
2009, p. 10) 
The U.S. Army Contracting Center of Excellence (CCE), a subordinate 
contracting center within NCRCC, provides contracting support to the Army 
Secretariat and the Army Staff.  Its mission is “to provide the best possible, 
customer-focused, contracting support and service throughout the National 
Capital Region” (CCE, 2009).  Among other things, CCE provides 
telecommunication equipment and services, advertising, training, and studies.  
CCE also manages the DoD Purchase Card Program for the National Capital 




Figure 5.   CCE Organizational Structure (From CCE, 2009) 
The U.S. Army Information Technology, E-Commerce, and Commercial 
Contracting Center (ITEC4), NCRCC’s second subordinate contracting center, 
provides worldwide information technology contracting support and procures 
enterprise information technology support and equipment for Army and other 
Department of Defense (DoD) activities.  Its primary mission is “to establish 
master contracts to acquire information technology products and services for the 
Army Enterprise” (ITEC4, 2009).  ITEC4 has four procurement divisions in two 
locations:  Alexandria, VA and Fort Huachuca, AZ.  The Alexandria, VA location 
is ITEC4 headquarters and it supports the Army Chief Information Officer 
(CIO/G6), the Program Executive Officer, and the Enterprise Information 
Systems (PEO EIS).  ITEC4’s Fort Huachuca, AZ location, also known as “ITEC4 
West” or “Division C,” supports the U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology 
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Command (NETCOM) and Fort Huachuca Garrison.  ITEC4’s organizational 






















































Figure 6.   ITEC4 Organizational Structure (From Public Folders, 2009) 
NCRCC’s contracting workforce consists of contract specialists, 
contracting officers, managers and senior leaders.  The total number of NCRCC 
employees grade GS-12 and above during April through September 2008 is 243.  
One hundred twelve (112) of those employees belonged to CCE and 131 
belonged to ITEC4.  The total number of NCRCC employees grade GS-12 and 
above during October 2008 through March 2009 is 231.  One hundred (100) of 
those employees belonged to CCE and 131 belonged to ITEC4.  This total 
includes employees supporting both core and reimbursable customers and 
ITEC4 West employees. 
The NCRCC contracting workforce also is supplemented with interns and 
fellows.  The Army Career Training & Education Development System (ACTEDS) 
program recruits and funds positions for Department of the Army (DA) interns 
throughout worldwide organizations.  ACC recruits local interns for specific 
authorized positions within the command (ACC, 2009, n.p.).  Fellows are 
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participants in the Competitive Development Group/Army Acquisition 
Fellowship (CDG/AAF) Program, a three-year developmental program designed 
to develop future Army acquisition leaders (USAASC, 2009). 
NCRCC employees occupy positions from two different pay plans.  CCE 
employees work under the National Security Personnel System (NSPS), a 
performance-based pay plan (NSPS, 2009).  ITEC4 employees work under two 
pay plans.  ITEC4 managers work under the NSPS plan and nonsupervisory 
employees work under the traditional Federal Government General Schedule 
(GS) plan, a length of service based pay plan (OPM Pay Plans, 2009).  Any 
reference to GS employees throughout the remainder of this study shall also 
apply to equivalent NSPS employees. 
During fiscal year 2009, CCE awarded 3663 actions totaling approximately 
$1.2 billion.  Its prior fiscal year totals were 5,860 actions and $1.7 billion dollars.  
ITEC4 awarded 6526 actions totaling approximately $2.5 billion during fiscal year 
2009.  Prior fiscal year totals for ITEC4 were 6,999 actions totaling $2.6 billion 
(SitRep, 2009). 
NCRCC is appropriate for this study because CCE and ITEC4 were 
separate, unrelated contracting organizations until January 2009 when ACC 
combined them to form NCRCC.  Since the relationship between these two 
subordinate contracting centers is new, they are located in separate buildings 
and as explained above, their organizational structures are different, their 
employees occupy different pay plans, they provide different types of contracting 
support, and their contract processes are different.  . 
Currently, the only common thread that exists between the two centers is 
the NCRCC Office of the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting 
(OPARC) that stood up concurrently with the formation of NCRCC.  NCRCC 
OPARC responsibilities include providing policy support, assessing 
organizational efficiency and effectiveness in performing procurement functions, 
and coordinating contracting and acquisition management training.  The results 
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of this study can assist the OPARC staff by serving as a baseline assessment for 
employee turnover data and CM process improvement. 
E. SUMMARY 
NCRCC is a newly formed contracting center that falls within AMC and 
ACC.  It consists of two subordinate contracting centers, CCE and ITEC4 that 
have different organizational structures, employee pay plans, and perform 
different types of services.  Since NCRCC is in its infancy, it will benefit from this 
baseline assessment.  This chapter describes NCRCC, its major commands, and 
its subordinate commands.  It also explains why NCRCC is suitable for this 
study.  The next chapter will discuss the results of the turnover analysis and the 
CM process maturity analysis. 
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IV. ASSESSMENT RESULTS, DATA ANALYSIS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the results of the NCRCC 
turnover analysis and the results of the CM process maturity analysis.  First, this 
chapter presents the NCRCC turnover rate and the costs associated with it as 
well as NCRCC contract specialist’s experience, qualifications and credentials.  
Second, it provides recommendations for managing NCRCC turnover.  Lastly, 
this chapter presents CCE’s and ITEC4’s CM process maturity level determined 
by using the CMMM © and provides recommendations for improving CM process 
maturity. 
B. NCRCC’S EMPLOYEE TURNOVER RATE 
Aside from the turnover calculations presented in this study, NCRCC 
stakeholders have not determined its employee turnover rate for the contracting 
center as a whole.  CCE HR informed the researcher that it calculates turnover 
for its subordinate contracting center but does not calculate turnover for specific 
demographics as recommended by the authors of Human Resources 
Management.  ITEC4 does not calculate its employee turnover rate at all. 
Table 2 illustrates the average monthly NCRCC contract specialist 
turnover rate for April 2008 through March 2009 as determined for this research.  
The turnover rate data obtained from NCRCC’s HR used to calculate the 
turnover rate and set forth in Appendix 1, shows that the average turnover for the 




NCRCC Turnover Data                                                             
Grade GS-12 and above (or NSPS equivalent) Nonsupervisory                           
(April 2008 – March 2009) 






Employees     
(Total Billet – 
Vacant Billets 
+ New Hires) 
Monthly 
Turnover     
(Separations 
× 100 / Total 
Employees) 
April 2008 7 204 68 9 145 3.80 
May 2008 5 204 65 3 142 2.72 
June 2008 5 204 68 2 138 2.72 
July 2008 8 204 67 1 138 4.35 
August 2008 8 204 80 11 135 4.35 
September 2008 6 204 74 3 133 3.26 
October 2008 4 192 71 5 126 2.17 
November 2008 3 192 71 2 123 1.63 
December 2008 4 192 67 5 130 2.17 
January 2009 7 192 69 5 128 3.80 
February 2009 3 192 76 8 124 1.63 
March 2009 6 192 69 9 132 3.26 
   Average monthly turnover: 2.99 
Table 2.   NCRCC Turnover Data 
Turnover rates vary among industries and can range from zero employees 
to an entire demographic (Mathis & Jackson, 2003, p. 90).  Organizations can 
determine if their turnover rate is high or low by comparing it to its competitors or 
to its own historical turnover data. 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data, the Federal 
Government’s average employee turnover for the period observed is 1.29.  
Figure 7 illustrates the NCRCC and Federal Government turnover trend lines for 
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April 2008 through March 2009.  The trend line for NCRCC turnover is consistent 
with the Federal Government’s trend line from May 2008 through March 2009, 
although it is more than twice that of the Federal Government’s turnover rate for 
the same period (JOLTS, 2009). 
 
Figure 7.   Turnover Trend Analysis (From JOLTS, 2009) 
Despite the NCRCC turnover rate’s relationship to the Federal 
Government’s rate, it remained less than 5.0 for the entire period observed.  The 
BLS Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) describe turnover rates 
below 3.2 as ‘low’ (JOLTS, 2009).  Based on this information, the NCRCC 
average turnover for the period observed can be considered low. 
C. NCRCC’S COST OF TURNOVER 
Although NCRCC’s turnover rate is considered low, the NCRCC 
stakeholders might still calculate the costs associated with this turnover rate and 
determine its impact on the organization.  Figure 8 calculates estimated costs 
associated with NCRCC’s turnover rate using the Simplified Turnover Costing 
Model in Figure 1. 
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The benefits costs (B), length of learning curve (E), and percentage of 
productivity (F) may vary and NCRCC stakeholders can substitute these 
numbers with information unavailable for this research.   The numbers used in 
this calculation are conservative averages as recommended in Human Resource 
Management (Mathis & Jackson, 2003, p. 90). 
A. Annual pay for GS-13 Step 1 (OPM Salary Table, 2009): $ 86,927 
B. 40% for benefits × annual pay: $ 34,770 
C. Total employee annual cost (A + B): $121,697 
D. Employee departures over 12 months observed: 73 
E. Learning curve: 3 months 
F. Per person turnover cost (E ÷ 12 × C × 50%)*: $15,212 
G. Annual turnover cost (F × D): $1,110,476 
*Assumes 50% productivity throughout the learning period (E). 
Figure 8.   Cost of NCRCC Turnover April 2008–March 2009 
Figure 8 shows that NCRCC’s turnover cost for April 2008 through March 
2009 is approximately $1.1 million.  Additional costs that NCRCC stakeholders 
should consider include the intangible costs discussed in Chapter II such as 
possible damage to the NCRCC brand and loss of intellectual assets. 
D. NCRCC’S CONTRACT SPECIALIST EXPERIENCE, QUALIFICATIONS, 
AND CREDENTIALS 
Employee qualifications and credentials substantiate NCRCC’s intellectual 
data.  Tracking this employee data helps stakeholders measure the intangible 
costs associated with turnover.  Stakeholders can also use this data to link the 
impact of turnover to CM process capability maturity. 
Tracking employee experience is one approach to measuring the 
intangible costs.  However, NCRCC HR does not maintain records with regard to 
contract specialist experience nor does any other branch or division within 
NCRCC.  NCRCC HR managers explained that this data cannot be determined 
based on HR records because many NCRCC employees are new to the 
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Government so their previous experience is not in the HR record system.  
Additionally, the current HR record system did not exist prior to the year 2002, so 
complete data is not available for employees who have years of experience 
within the center.  NCRCC interns and fellows have no experience to track, and 
NCRCC no longer has access to, or maintains personnel data for employees 
who have separated from the center.  Subsequently, it is not possible for HR to 
determine the average number of years of contracting experience for GS-1102 
employees hired or those who separated during the period observed for this 
research. 
Another approach to measuring the intangible costs of employee turnover 
is to examine NCRCC’s employee credentials.  The Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) enacted in 1990, requires DoD to establish 
formal career paths for individuals who pursue careers in acquisition. DoD has an 
established formal certification process that applies to all DoD acquisition 
professionals, to include NCRCC contract specialists (DAWIA, 2009). 
 NCRCC requires its interns and fellows to have a DAWIA Level I 
certification for grades GS-5 and G-7.  These employees must have a minimum 
of 24 semester hours in accounting, law, business, finance, contracts, 
purchasing, economics, industrial management, marketing, quantitative methods, 
or organization and management and a baccalaureate degree in any field of 
study along with 1 year of contracting experience and required acquisition and 
functional training (DAWIA Level I, 2009). 
NCRCC requires its interns and fellows grades GS-9 and GS-11 and 
contract specialists grade GS-12 to have a DAWIA Level II certification.  These 
employees must have a minimum of 24 semester hours in accounting, law, 
business, finance, contracts, purchasing, economics, industrial management, 
marketing, quantitative methods, or organization and management and a 
baccalaureate degree in any field of study along with 2 years of contracting 
experience and required acquisition and functional training (DAWIA Level II, 
2009). 
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NCRCC requires its contract specialists, grades GS-13 and GS-14 to have 
a DAWIA Level III certification.  These employees must have a minimum of 24 
semester hours in accounting, law, business, finance, contracts, purchasing, 
economics, industrial management, marketing, quantitative methods, or 
organization and management and a baccalaureate degree in any field of study 
along with 4 years of contracting experience and required acquisition and 
functional training (DAWIA Level II, 2009). 
Further, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) also authorizes 
exceptions for employees that qualify for grandfathering based on years of 
experience.  OPM also permits waivers for senior procurement officials (OPM 
Qualification Standard, 2009). 
According to NCRCC’s HR, all of the contract specialists included in this 
research, with the exception of an insignificant number of grandfathered 
employees, possess a bachelor’s or advanced degree and have at least 24 
business credits.  All but one CCE employee meets the required certification 
level in accordance with OPM standards (OPM Qualification Standard, 2009, 
n.p.).  DAWIA certification is not currently available for NCRCC contractor 
employees.  Contract specialist interns are all working towards obtaining 
certification. 
A high turnover rate for these highly-educated and fully-trained employees 
could impede NCRCC’s ability to perform CM processes at a high maturity level.  
However, since the turnover rate for these employees is comparatively low and 
the workforce is stable, they should be performing CM processes at a high 
maturity level, if those processes are standardized and management requires 




E. TURNOVER RECOMMENDATIONS 
People are an agency’s most important organizational asset. An 
organization’s people define its character, affect its capacity to 
perform, and represent the knowledge-base of the organization. As 
such, effective strategic human capital management approaches 
serve as the cornerstone of any serious change management 
initiative.  (GAO-02-373SP, p. 4, 2009) 
NCRCC can best manage it’s ‘most important organizational asset’ and its 
reputation or image – it’s brand, by managing employee turnover, tracking total 
cost of ownership, retaining employees who possess key skills, controlling 
employee separations, conducting follow-up assessments and adjusting its 
efforts as appropriate. 
Although NCRCC does not appear to have a problem with turnover 
currently, the NCRCC HR should periodically measure and track employee 
turnover for the entire contracting center, as well as for the subordinate 
contracting centers and specific divisions and branches in order to track the 
internal churn rate.  This will permit NCRCC leadership to track patterns and 
identify potential problem areas, particularly with regard to controllable and 
dysfunctional turnover rates (Mathis & Jackson, 2003, pp. 90–91).  NCRCC 
leadership should implement employee surveys with its employees and conduct 
exit interviews with separating employees to “diagnose specific problem areas, 
identify employee needs or preferences and reveal areas in which HR activities 
are well received or viewed negatively” (Mathis & Jackson, 2003, pp. 90–91).  By 
obtaining this information early, the leadership will have the opportunity to plan 
and implement solutions before problems become critical. 
NCRCC leadership should also measure and track how employee 
turnover impacts its total cost of ownership (Harrison, J.S., 2008, p. 58).  NCRCC 
can track its tangible costs using a costing model similar to the one set forth in 
Chapter II and taking into account other direct costs of recruiting and retaining 
employees, such as marketing, advertising, salary, benefits, and training.  These 
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costs are recurring for organizations with a high employee turnover rate (Mathis 
& Jackson, 2003, p. 90).  The leadership should also take into account intangible 
costs such as customer goodwill, reputation and image (Carter, 2008, p. 58). 
NCRCC leadership should focus on retaining its most talented CM 
personnel in order to lower its intangible costs.  Retaining top performers allows 
the contracting center to keep its employee turnover rate low.  Expending 
resources to retain poor performers will not protect the NCRCC brand and may 
harm it instead.  Leadership should aim to select the right people in the first place 
and hire “people with the talent, ability, and smarts to work in almost any position 
even if you don't currently have the "best" match available” (Heathfield, 2009). 
Establishing a section or division responsible for maintaining employee 
qualifications, credentials, and track career development is one approach to 
identifying top NCRCC top performers.  Once leadership identifies these 
individuals, it can strategically place them in positions that will help the center to 
meet its needs. 
Leadership should aim to retain experienced CM personnel to help protect 
NCRCC’s intellectual assets (Harrison, J.S., 2008, p. 58).  These employees 
should document lessons learned, and best practices, and work with newer 
employees to transfer institutional knowledge to them. 
NCRCC leadership should pay particular attention to CM personnel who 
possess business and organizational skills beyond the traditional CM skills.  
These individuals not only have working knowledge of the FAR and can apply it, 
but possess the following key skills:  “good interpersonal communication, 
customer focus, decision-making ability, analytical and negotiation skills, conflict-
resolution skills, flexibility, problem-solving skills, the ability to influence and 
persuade, and computer literacy” (Nelson, S., 2006, p 43).  These employees are 
also “accomplished at articulating and conveying personal and organizational 
values and skilled in organizational politics, networking, and follow-through as 
aides to “getting things done” effectively, efficiently, and with business acumen” 
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(Nelson, S., 2006, p 43).  Developing and retaining employees with these skills 
will enhance the NCRCC brand. 
NCRCC leadership should provide cross-training and career progression 
opportunities for employees who wish to take advantage of these developmental 
programs.  This would include implementing training and educational 
opportunities for career and personal growth and assigning challenging work 
projects and more responsibility to employees who wish to grow (Heathfield, 
2009). 
NCRCC leadership should also recognize that even under the best 
circumstances, employees might choose to leave the organization for personal 
reasons such as career advancement or new experiences.  It is unlikely that 
NCRCC can prevent this; however, it can control it to mitigate any possible 
damage that it may cause.  Leadership should initiate a portability program with 
other contracting organizations in which participating contracting organizations 
can permit employees to swap positions with employees from other participating 
organizations as long as both swapping employees have the same or similar 
credentials.  This mutually beneficial arrangement would allow employees to 
expand their breadth of experience, reduce the number of vacancies, and reduce 
the costs associated with skill deficits. 
“Once retention intervention efforts have been implemented, it is important 
that they be evaluated and appropriate follow-up and adjustments made” (Mathis 
& Jackson, 2003, p. 93).  Proactive efforts to control employee turnover and 
development will protect the NCRCC brand and allow NCRCC to maintain a 
competitive advantage over other organizations in the National Capital Region 
(NCR), in terms of successful performance. 
F. NCRCC’S CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS CAPABILITY 
MATURITY 
This research evaluates CM process capability maturity for CCE and 
ITEC4 separately.  This approach proves to be most beneficial for a variety of 
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reasons.  First, assessing maturity for each subordinate contacting center 
separately allows a more detailed and focused assessment of NCRCC’s CM 
process maturity.  Second, separate assessments allow NCRCC stakeholders to 
identify process capability or knowledge deficiencies in each subordinate 
contracting center so that it can tailor specific training and education efforts to 
improve the process maturity for the divisions or departments that need it.  Third, 
individual subordinate contracting center assessments will allow NCRCC 
stakeholders to identify best practices and lessons learned in one subordinate 
contracting center and share these with the other.  Last, with separate 
assessments, comparisons and analyses can be made between the two centers, 
thus, NCRCC stakeholders can tailor its training and process improvement 
efforts on similar contract requirements (e.g. master contracts for Army or DoD 
use)” (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 80). 
This study assessed survey responses from NCRCC nonsupervisory 
contract specialists grade GS-12 and above.  Approximately 204 employees 
were eligible to participate and 137 surveys were completed (20 for CCE and 117 
for ITEC4) for a response rate of 67%. 
Table 3 illustrates the CM process maturity level for NCRCC.  The table 
shows that CCE’s CM process maturity level for five of the key process areas:  
Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Contract 
Administration, and Contract Closeout is Ad-hoc.  Its maturity level for Source 
Selection is Basic.  ITEC4’s CM process maturity level is Basic for all six key 
processes areas. 
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CONTRACT MANAGEMENT MATURITY MODEL© 
Maturity 
Level 













      
Level 4 
Integrated 
      
Level 3 
Structured 
      
Level 2 
Basic 
      
Level 1 
Ad-Hoc 
      
Table 3.   NCRCC Contract Management Maturity Model © 
1. Contracting Center of Excellence 
CCE’s survey responses for Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, 
Solicitation, Contract Administration, and Contract Closeout processes indicate 
that CCE acknowledges that CM processes exist, that these processes are 
accepted and practiced throughout various industries, and CCE’s management 
understands the benefit and value of using CM processes.  Although there are 
not any organization-wide established basic CM processes, some established 
CM processes may exist and CCE personnel use them but only apply them on 
an ad-hoc and sporadic basis to various contracts.  Informal documentation of 
CM processes may also exist but CCE personnel only use them sporadically as 
well on various contracts.  Further, NCRCC leadership does not hold CCE 
managers and personnel accountable for adhering to, or complying with, any CM 
processes or standards (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 53). 
CCE’s survey responses for the Source Selection process indicate that 
CCE has established some basic Source Selection processes and standards but 
management does not require NCRCC personnel to use them on all contracts.  
ITEC4 
ITEC4 
ITEC4 ITEC4 ITEC4 ITEC4
CCE CCE CCE CCE CCE 
CCE 
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CCE personnel apply standards only to selected complex, critical, or high-
visibility contracts, such as contracts meeting certain dollar thresholds, or 
contracts with certain customers.  CCE has some formal documentation for these 
established Source Selection processes and standards but does not consider 
them fully-established or institutionalized throughout CCE.  There is no 
organizational policy requiring the consistent use of these Source Selection 
processes and standards other than on the required contracts (Garrett & 
Rendon, 2005a, p. 53). 
2. Information Technology, E-Commerce and Commercial 
Contracting Center  
ITEC4’s survey responses for Procurement Planning, Solicitation 
Planning, Solicitation, Source Selection, Contract Administration, and Contract 
Closeout processes indicate that ITEC4 has established some basic CM 
processes and standards but management does not require its personnel to use 
them on all contracts.  ITEC4 personnel apply standards only to selected 
complex, critical, or high-visibility contracts, such as contracts meeting certain 
dollar thresholds, or contracts with certain customers.  ITEC4 has some formal 
documentation for these established CM processes and standards but does not 
consider these CM processes or standards fully established or institutionalized 
throughout ITEC4.  There is no organizational policy requiring the consistent use 
of these CM processes and standards other than on the required contracts 
(Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 53). 
G. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS CAPABILITY MATURITY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Contracting Center of Excellence 
Based on CMMM © survey responses, CCE received an Ad-hoc maturity 
rating for the Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Contract 
Administration, and Contract Closeout key process areas.  NCRCC leadership 
should be seriously concerned that, according to the survey responses, there are 
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no established basic processes and standards in place for these CM processes 
(Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 89).  Survey responses indicate that in CCE, 
processes and standards exist and CCE documents them only on an ad-hoc and 
sporadic basis.  Further, based on survey responses, NCRCC leadership does 
not hold CCE managers and CM personnel accountable for adhering to, or 
complying with, any processes or standards.  NCRCC and CCE leadership 
should be concerned about its personnel’s awareness and understanding of 
contract standards and documentation requirements for these processes (Garrett 
& Rendon, 2005a, p. 89). 
In order for CCE to move up to the Basic maturity level, NCRCC and CCE 
leadership should establish processes and standards for Procurement Planning, 
Solicitation Planning, and Solicitation, Contract Administration, and Contract 
Closeout key process areas and require CCE personnel to use them on their 
contracts.  NCRCC and CCE leadership should develop formal documentation 
for CCE’s processes and standards and institutionalize them throughout the CCE 
(Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 53). 
CCE received a Basic maturity rating for the Source Selection key process 
area.  In order for CCE to move up to the Structured level, NCRCC and CCE 
leadership should fully-establish Source Selection processes and standards, 
institutionalize them, and mandate CCE personnel to use them on all contracts.  
Leadership should develop formal documentation for their Source Selection 
processes and standards and take steps to automate them.  NCRCC and CCE 
leadership should be involved in providing guidance, direction, and approval of 
key contracting strategy, decisions, related contract terms and conditions, and 
Source Selection documents (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 53). 
Moreover, NCRCC and CCE leadership should initiate organization-wide 
Source Selection training programs that cover using evaluation criteria, 
evaluation standards, and a weighting system to evaluate proposals, using 
sealed bidding procedures and contracting by negotiations, using appropriate 
selection criteria, such as lowest cost/technically acceptable or best value to 
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meet the objectives of the acquisition strategy.  This training should also include 
comparing cost proposals with independent, internal cost estimates, considering 
offerors’ past performance, as well as technical, managerial, and financial 
capability (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 66). 
2. Information Technology, E-Commerce and Commercial 
Contracting Center 
Based on CMMM © survey responses, ITEC4 received a Basic maturity 
rating for all six key process areas.  In order for ITEC4 to move up to the 
Structured level, NCRCC and ITEC4 leadership should fully-establish processes 
and standards for all of the key process areas, institutionalize them, and mandate 
ITEC4 personnel to use them on all contracts.  Leadership should develop formal 
documentation for their CM processes and standards and take steps to automate 
them.  NCRCC and ITEC4 leadership should be involved in providing guidance, 
direction, and approval of key contracting strategy, decisions, related contract 
terms and conditions, and CM documents (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 53). 
Once ITEC4 increases its maturity to the Structured level for all CM 
process areas, it should pursue higher CM process maturity levels by developing 
and implementing efficiency and effectiveness metrics to measure the CM 
processes and to make contracts-related decisions and require NCRCC 
personnel to use them.  The leadership should also build a lessons-learned and 
best practices database as a resource for NCRCC personnel to use.  This would 
also be effective in increasing the maturity level for each of the six key process 
areas (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 88). 
H. SUMMARY 
The chapter presented the NCRCC turnover analysis results, CM process 
maturity analysis results and discussed recommendations for improvement. 
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NCRCC’s average turnover for the period observed is approximately 2.99.  
This is more than twice that of the Federal Government’s turnover rate for the 
same period but based on the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, it is considered 
low.  Despite the low rate, NCRCC stakeholders should continue to monitor 
turnover, track the costs associated with it, and assess is impact on the 
organization.  NCRCC leadership should implement measures to retain its 
employees because seasoned contract specialists should be capable of 
performing CM processes at a high maturity level, so long as NCRCC has 
standardized, institutional processes and management requires employees to 
use them. 
CMMM© survey results show that CCE’s CM process maturity level for 
five of the key process areas:  Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, 
Solicitation, Contract Administration, and Contract Closeout is Ad-hoc and its 
maturity level for Source Selection is Basic.  ITEC4’s CM process maturity level 
is Basic for all six key processes areas.  NCRCC and CCE leadership should be 
concerned about its personnel’s awareness and understanding of CM process 
standards and documentation requirements for these processes and take steps 
to move CCE up to the Basic maturity level for those areas.  NCRCC leadership 
should also take the necessary steps to move CCE up to the Structured level for 
Source Selection.  Additionally, NCRCC leadership should take steps so that 
ITEC4 moves up to the Structured level for all six key process areas.  These 
steps include establishing and institutionalizing processes and standards, and 
mandating its employees to use them on all contracts.  Once NCRCC reaches 
Structured maturity level for all CM processes, it can focus on pursuing higher 
levels of CM process capability.  This would involve initiating organization-wide 
CM training, developing efficiency and effectiveness metrics, and building a 
lessons-learned and best practices database.  The next chapter will present the 
author’s research conclusions, summarize the research findings, and discuss 
possible areas for further research. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters discussed the purpose and objectives of the study, 
provided background information, and introduced the primary and secondary 
research questions.  The study discussed the current contracting environment, 
employee turnover, CM process capability and the Contract Management 
Maturity Model © (CMMM), and their impact of contracting organizations.  Next, it 
outlined the National Capital Region Contracting Center role in the Army and 
explained why NCRCC is suitable for this study.  Then it provided the results of 
the NCRCC turnover analysis and the results of the CM process maturity 
analysis. 
This final chapter will summarize the research presented, provide the 
research conclusions, and present areas for further research. 
B. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
This study analyzed the turnover rate for NCRCC contract specialists 
grade GS-12 and above for the period of April 2008 through March 2009.  This 
research also assessed NCRCC’s Contract Management (CM) process 
capability maturity level by deploying survey questions to the targeted NCRCC 
workforce and using the Contract Management Maturity Model ©.    
Based on the research results, here are the answers to the two primary 




Primary Research Questions 
1. What is the Current Turnover Rate of Contract Specialists in 
NCRCC? 
The average monthly NCRCC contract specialist turnover rate for April 
2008 through March 2009 is approximately 2.99.  This is more than twice the 
turnover rate of the entire Federal Government, which is 1.29 for the same period 
but is low given the competitive environment in which NCRCC is located.   
2. What is the Current Maturity Level of NCRCC’s Contract 
Management Processes? 
CCE’s CM process maturity level for five of the six key process areas, 
Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Contract 
Administration, and Contract Closeout is Ad-hoc.  CCE’s maturity level for 
Source Selection is Basic.  ITEC4’s CM process maturity level is Basic for all six 
key processes areas. 
Subsidiary Research Questions 
3. Is There a Relationship Between NCRCC Contract Specialist 
Turnover and the Maturity Level of its Contract Management 
Processes? 
Based on the research results and analysis presented above, there is no 
apparent relationship between NCRCC contract specialist turnover and the 
maturity level of its CM process capability. 
4. How Does the Contract Specialist Turnover Rate Affect 
NCRCC’s Contract Specialist Average Experience Level? 
NCRCC does not maintain records with regard to contract specialist 
experience. 
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5. How Does NCRCC’s Contract Specialist Average Experience 
Level Affect its Training Requirement? 
NCRCC does not maintain records with regard to contract specialist 
experience. 
6. How Can NCRCC Raise its Maturity Level? 
In order for CCE to raise its maturity level for Procurement Planning, 
Solicitation Planning, and Solicitation, Contract Administration, and Contract 
Closeout key process areas, NCRCC and CCE leadership should establish 
processes and standards for those areas and require CCE personnel to use 
them on their contracts.  NCRCC and CCE leadership should develop formal 
documentation for CCE’s processes and standards and institutionalize 
throughout the CCE (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 53). 
In order for CCE to raise its maturity level for the Source Selection key 
process area, NCRCC and CCE leadership should fully-establish Source 
Selection processes and standards, institutionalize them, and mandate CCE 
personnel to use them on all contracts.  Leadership should develop formal 
documentation for their Source Selection processes and standards and take 
steps to automate them.  NCRCC and CCE leadership should be involved in 
providing guidance, direction, and approval of key contracting strategy, 
decisions, related contract terms and conditions, and Source Selection 
documents (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 53). 
NCRCC and CCE leadership should also initiate an organization-wide 
Source Selection training program that covers using evaluation criteria, 
evaluation standards, and a weighting system to evaluate proposals, using 
sealed bidding procedures and contracting by negotiations, using appropriate 
selection criteria, such as lowest cost/technically acceptable or best value to 
meet the objectives of the acquisition strategy.  This training should also include 
comparing cost proposals with independent, internal cost estimates, considering 
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the offeror’s past performance, as well as technical, managerial, and financial 
capability (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 66). 
In order for ITEC4 to raise its maturity level for Procurement Planning, 
Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Source Selection, Contract Administration, and 
Contract Closeout key process areas, NCRCC and ITEC4 leadership should 
establish processes and standards for all of the key process areas, 
institutionalize them, and mandate ITEC4 personnel to use them on all contracts.  
Leadership should develop formal documentation for their CM processes and 
standards and take steps to automate them.  NCRCC and ITEC4 leadership 
should be involved in providing guidance, direction, and approval of key 
contracting strategy, decisions, related contract terms and conditions, and CM 
documents (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 53). 
Having achieved Structured for all CM process areas, the NCRCC 
leadership should develop efficiency and effectiveness metrics to measure the 
CM processes and to make contracts-related decisions and require NCRCC 
personnel to use them.  The leadership should also build a lessons-learned and 
best practices database as a resource for NCRCC personnel to use.  This would 
also be effective in increasing the maturity level for each of the six key process 
areas (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a, p. 88). 
C. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
The research shows that the NCRCC turnover rate is low as compared to 
the Federal Government’s turnover rate for the period observed; however, 
NCRCC leadership should take measures to protect its brand by managing 
employee turnover, tracking total cost of ownership, retaining employees who 
possess key skills, controlling employee separations and following up and 
adjusting its efforts. 
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Although NCRCC’s turnover rate is low, the NCRCC stakeholders should 
analyze its turnover rate regularly in order to track its progress and make 
adjustments as needed.  The stakeholders should also use the turnover data to 
calculate and track the costs associated with it and determine its impact on the 
organization.  They should remember to take into account intangible costs 
associated with turnover such as possible damage to the NCRCC brand and loss 
of intellectual assets.  NCRCC leadership should implement measures to retain 
its employees because seasoned contract specialists should be capable of 
performing CM processes at a high maturity level, so long as NCRCC has 
standardized, institutional processes and management requires employees to 
use them. 
The research also shows that generally, the CM process maturity level for 
NCRCC is low.  CCE received an Ad-hoc maturity rating for the Procurement 
Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Contract Administration, and 
Contract Closeout key process areas and a Basic maturity rating for the Source 
Selection key process area.  ITEC4 received a Basic maturity rating for all six key 
process areas.  NCRCC can improve CCE’s and ITEC4’s process maturity levels 
in each of the key areas by establishing formal processes, standardizing them 
and mandating their use.  Additionally, NCRCC leadership should implement a 
training program for its employees focused on the key process areas.  Finally, 
NCRCC leadership should use efficiency and effectiveness metrics to measure 
the CM processes and to make contracts-related decisions (Garrett & Rendon, 
2005a, p. 89). 
Based on the research results and analysis presented above, there is no 
apparent relationship between NCRCC contract specialist turnover and the 
maturity level of its CM process capability.  The NCRCC turnover rate is slightly 
higher than, but consistent with, the turnover rate for the entire Federal 
Government nationwide during the period observed, which is fairly low, given the 
current ‘buyer’s market’ for contract specialists in NCR.  Research shows that for 
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the period observed, NCRCC has a stable workforce with regard to its 
employees who work at journeyman or advanced levels. 
On the other hand, the NCRCC CM process capability levels are immature 
for each of its subordinate contracting centers.  CCE does not appear to have 
established basic CM processes and performs functions informally and 
sporadically.  In addition, in the area of Source Selection, it has some established 
CM processes but does not utilize the processes consistently for all of its 
procurements.  ITEC4 appears to have established CM processes for all six key 
process areas but does not utilize them consistently.  It is not evident, based on 
the research that the NCRCC contract specialist turnover is related to CM 
process capability. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The author’s recommendations for additional research based on this 
study’s findings are as follows: 
The NCRCC Office of the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting 
(OPARC) should use the results of this study as a baseline assessment for 
NCRCC employee turnover and CM process improvement.  Since NCRCC is a 
newly formed contracting organization, its leadership and OPARC are in the 
process of establishing standardize CM processes.  The results of identifies 
areas that need additional emphasis and can assist the PARC and OPARC in 
determining where to focus its efforts. 
The NCRCC stakeholders should reassess and document its turnover rate 
regularly and report it to management so that management can spot trends, 
potential problems, and make adjustments as needed.   
The NCRCC stakeholders should reassess CM process maturity regularly 
using the CMMM© to track the results of process improvement efforts and the 
implementation of lessons learned and best practices. 
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The NCRCC stakeholders should compare the results of the study with 
those of other ACC contracting organizations to allow for comparisons and 
analyses between organizations so that ACC stakeholders can implement broad 
training and process improvement efforts. 
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APPENDIX  NCRCC CONTRACT SPECIALIST STATISTICAL 
DATA AND QUALIFICATION QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
The author collected NCRCC contract specialist turnover statistical data 
and qualifications from NCRCC’s HR for the period of April 2008 through March 
2009.  The author used this data to calculate the turnover rate and determine if 
there was a relationship between turnover and CM process maturity.  The 
questions asked and HR’s answers are as follows: 
1. Contract Specialist Turnover Rate Statistics 
1) How many GS-1102 billets grade GS-12 and above (or NSPS 
equivalent) did CCE\ITEC4 have for the period observed? 
 Answer: 
 April – September 2008 
 Total GS-12 and above:  243 (112\131) 
 Managers:  39 (28\11) 
 Total Nonsupervisory Grade GS-12 and above:   243 – 39 = 204 
 October 2008 – March 2009 
 Total GS-12 and above:  231 (100\131) 
 Managers:  39 (28\11) 







2) How many vacant billets did CCE\ITEC4 have each month during 
the period observed? 
 Answer: 
NCRCC Vacant 1102 Billets 
Grade GS-12 and above (or NSPS 
equivalent) Non Supervisory 
(April 2008 – March 2009) 
Month CCE\ITEC4 
April 2008 68 (40\28) 
May 2008 65 (40\25) 
June 2008 68 (43\25) 
July 2008 67 (46\21) 
August 2008 80 (49\31) 
September 2008 74 (49\25) 
October 2008 71 (43\28) 
November 2008 71 (43\28) 
December 2008 67 (42\25) 
January 2009 69 (43\26) 
February 2009 76 (45\31) 







3) How many new GS-1102 employees did CCE\ITEC4 hire to fill 
vacant billets each month during the period observed? 
 Answer: 
NCRCC 1102 New Hires 
Grade GS-12 and above (or NSPS 
equivalent) Non Supervisory 
(April 2008 – March 2009) 
Month CCE\ITEC4 
April 2008 9 (3\6) 
May 2008 3 (0\3) 
June 2008 2 (1\1) 
July 2008 1 (0\1) 
August 2008 11 (3\8) 
September 2008 3 (0\3) 
October 2008 5 (2\3) 
November 2008 2 (0\2) 
December 2008 5 (3\2) 
January 2009 5 (1\4) 
February 2009 8 (2\6) 







4) How many GS-1102 employees separated CCE\ITEC4 each month 
during the period observed? 
Answer: 
NCRCC 1102 Separations 
Grade GS-12 and above (or NSPS equivalent) 
Non Supervisory 
 (April 2008 – March 2009) 
Month CCE\ITEC4 
April 2008 7 (3\4) 
May 2008 5 (1\4) 
June 2008 5 (3\2) 
July 2008 8 (2\6) 
August 2008 8 (5\3) 
September 2008 6 (2\4) 
October 2008 4 (3\1) 
November 2008 3 (3\0) 
December 2008 4 (1\3) 
January 2009 7 (3\4) 
February 2009 3 (2\1) 







5) How many GS-1102 contractor employees does CCE\ITEC4 have? 
Answer:  44 (9\35) (Research data not used in report) 
6) How many GS-1102 interns does CCE\ITEC4 have? 
Answer:  47 (10\37) (Research data not used in report) 
7) How many GS-1102 employees are managers, branch chief or 
above? 
Answer:  39 (11\28) 
2. Contract Specialist Qualifications 
1) What is the average number of years of contracting experience for 
GS-1102 employees hired during the period observed? 
 Answer: 
 Information is unavailable because: 
• new to the Government so previous experience is not in the 
system,  
• interns and fellows have no experience, and 
• several have many years of experience but the information 
in the system does not go beyond 2002 
2) What is the average number of years of contracting experience for 
GS-1102 employees who separated during the period observed? 
Answer:  Information is unavailable because the people have 
left and therefore no longer able to see their personnel data in 
the system 
3) What is the required DAWIA certification level for each GS-1102 




• GS- 12:  Level II 
• GS-13: Level III 
4) How many GS-1102 employees meet the DAWIA certification level 
of their billet? 
Answer:  only one does not meet the DAWIA certification level 
of billet   
5) How GS-1102 contractor employees meet the DAWIA certification 
level of their position? 
Answer:  No access to this information  (Research data not 
used in report) 
6) What is the average DAWIA certification level for GS-1102 interns? 
Answer: 
• GS-5 and GS-7:  Level I 
• GS-9 and GS-11: Level II 
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